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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN JOURNAL of LAW REFORM

CAVEAT
MILLER V. ALABAMA: SOMETHING UNCONSTITUTIONAL
NOW WAS EQUALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL THEN
W. Patrick Conlon∗

Introduction
In June 2012, the United States Supreme Court found
mandatory life-without-parole sentences against juvenile offenders
1
unconstitutional in Miller v. Alabama. The Court determined that
because children possess “immaturity, impetuosity, and [fail] to
appreciate risks and consequences,” they are fundamentally
2
different than adults. Although Miller invalidated every juvenile
mandatory life-without-parole (JMLWOP) statute across the United
States, there is no clear indication regarding whether Miller
retroactively applies to juveniles sentenced to mandatory life3
without-parole before the Court’s ruling. As a result, states are
4
split on whether to apply Miller retroactively.
Fifteen states have yet to decide whether Miller applies
retroactively, while several other states have either (1) declined to
give Miller a retroactive effect or (2) passed legislation that does
not apply Miller retroactively or provide for resentencing for
5
JMLWOP. This Comment evaluates why the States should apply
Miller retroactively.

*
J.D. Candidate, May 2015, University of Michigan Law School.
1. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
2. Id. at 2468–70.
3. See id. at 2471.
4. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, Slow to Act: State Responses to 2012 Supreme Court
Mandate
on
Life
Without
Parole
1
(2014),
available
at
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_State_Responses_to_Miller.pdf.
5. Id. at 2.
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Current State of JMLWOP Laws

The Supreme Court has recognized that fundamental
differences between juveniles and adults warrant different
6
sentencing guidelines for each. In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme
Court found that juvenile death penalty sentences are an
7
unconstitutional violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Court
reasoned that:
[t]hree general differences between juveniles under 18 and
adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with
reliability be classified among the worst offenders. First,
[. . .] a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults
and are more understandable among the young. These
qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered
actions and decisions. [. . .] Second [,] [. . .] juveniles are
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and
outside pressures, including peer pressure. [. . .] Third, the
character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an
8
adult.
Based on these three fundamental differences, the Supreme
9
Court categorically distinguished juvenile from adults,
demonstrating the Court’s willingness to provide different
sentencing guidelines for juveniles and adults.
The Supreme Court further distinguished juveniles from adults
10
in Graham v. Florida. In Graham, the Court acknowledged that lifewithout-parole is “[t]he second most severe penalty permitted by
11
law,” and held that JMLWOP sentences for non-homicide
offenses were an unconstitutional violation of the Eighth
12
Amendment. The Court reasoned that “developments in
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental
differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts
of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Id.
Id. at 569–70 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2011).
Id.
Id.
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13
through late adolescence.” Furthermore, the Court recognized
that “[j]uveniles are more capable of change than adults, and
[juvenile] actions are less likely to be evidence of irretrievably
14
By again
depraved character than are the actions of adults.”
categorically banning certain sentences only for juveniles, the
15
Court established that the offender’s age bears on the analysis.
Thus, Roper and Graham provided a strong foundation for the Miller
Court to conclude that because “sentencers must be able to
consider the mitigating qualities of youth,” JMLWOP sentences are
16
unconstitutional.

A. Miller v. Alabama
In Miller, the Court tried two cases, both of which involved
fourteen-year-old boys who were convicted of murder and
17
statutorily given mandatory life-without-parole sentences.
The first case involved Kuntrell Jackson, a young teenager who
18
accompanied two boys to a video store to commit a robbery. On
the way to the store, Jackson learned that one of the other boys was
19
carrying a shotgun. Jackson stayed outside during most of the
robbery; however, when he entered the store, one of the other
20
boys shot and killed the store clerk. The Arkansas trial court
convicted fourteen-year-old Jackson of murder and sentenced him
21
to mandatory life-without-parole.
In the second case, Evan Miller and a friend beat Evan’s
22
neighbor and set fire to a trailer while the neighbor was inside.
The neighbor died and Miller was convicted of murder. He
23
received a statutorily-mandated life-without-parole sentence.
In response to these JMLWOP sentences, the Supreme Court
took the opportunity to further explain why these harsh sentences
are unconstitutional, noting that “[i]n neither case did the
sentencing authority have any discretion to impose a different
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 2026.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 2027.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2459.
Id. at 2457.
Id. at 2461.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2462.
Id. at 2463.
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24
punishment.” Rather, “State law mandated that each juvenile die
in prison even if a judge or jury would have thought that his youth
and its attendant characteristics, along with the nature of his
crime, made a lesser sentence (for example, life with the possibility
25
of parole) more appropriate.” Thus, the state statutes provided
no alternative punishment upon conviction.
By holding that juvenile mandatory life-without-parole
sentences are unconstitutional, the Miller Court recognized the
fundamental differences between juveniles and adults. The Court
reasoned any JMLWOP sentence contravened “Graham’s (and also
Roper’s) foundational principle: that imposition of a State’s most
severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though
26
they were not children.” Accordingly, the Court held that:

[m]andatory life-without-parole for a juvenile precludes
consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark
features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and
failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents
taking into account the family and home environment that
surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually
extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It
neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense,
including the extent of his participation in the conduct and
the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him.
Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and
convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies
associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal
with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea
27
agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys.
Thus, JMLWOP sentences violate the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments because they
prevent jurors and judges from considering a juvenile’s lessened
culpability and capacity for change, and instead determine the
juvenile remain in prison regardless of that individuals’
28
rehabilitation.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 2460
Id.
Id. at 2483.
Id. at 2468.
Id. at 2460.
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B. Current Retroactivity
Currently, an estimated 2,500 juveniles in the United States are
29
serving JMLWOP sentences. Most of these inmates, depending on
their state’s position regarding Miller’s retroactivity, await the
possibility of receiving resentencing hearings and reentering
society.
While some states are undecided on Miller’s retroactive effect,
Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Texas
30
Conversely, Supreme Courts in
apply Miller retroactively.
Louisiana, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania have ruled that Miller only
31
applies to future cases and therefore has no retroactive effect.
Furthermore, of the thirteen states that have passed post-Miller
legislation, only Delaware, North Carolina, Washington, and
Wyoming allow retroactive resentencing for the JMLWOP
population. Although some states are undecided, this Comment
argues that Miller should apply retroactively.
With respect to retroactivity, the Supreme Court held in Teague
32
v. Lane that constitutional rules of criminal procedure do not
apply to cases rendered final before the new rules were
33
announced. However, the Court also held that new rules may
apply retroactively if the rules require observance of “procedures
34
that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” The Court
further established that this exception pertains to “watershed rules
of criminal procedure” and “new procedures without which the
35
likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.”
36
Although the Court later held in Danforth v. Minnesota that state
courts do not need to use Teague’s analysis, several states have
37
nevertheless adopted the Teague framework.
The next section argues that Teague’s exception to new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure should encapsulate the
29. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE GOES ON: THE HISTORIC RISE IN LIFE SENTENCES IN
AMERICA
11
(2013),
available
at
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Life%20Goes%20On%202 013.pdf.
30. See supra note 5, at 3.
31. Id.
32. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
33. Id. at 290.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 311, 330.
36. 552 U.S. 264, 281 (2008).
37. See Johnson v. State, 904 So.2d 400, 414 (Fla. 2005) (Cantero, J., concurring)
(“[M]ost states have adopted the Teague standard, at least when determining the
retroactivity of constitutional decisions of the United States Supreme Court.”).
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Court’s holding in Miller.
II. States Should Apply Miller Retroactively
Each state should apply Miller retroactively pursuant to Teague
because Miller’s holding significantly reformed criminal procedure
and affected the lives of inmates currently serving JMLWOP
sentences. Inmates currently serving juvenile mandatory lifewithout-parole sentences could not have constitutionally received
38
such sentences today under Miller. Now, Miller requires that trial
courts consider “how children are different [from adults], and how
these differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a
39
lifetime in prison.” The individuals currently serving JMLWOPs
were not guaranteed these considerations during their trials.
Miller’s new rules would have drastically impacted their sentences.
Therefore, States should apply Miller retroactively to give these
juveniles a proper evaluation of their sentencing in light of the
additional considerations that Miller now requires.
In addition to changing criminal procedure, Miller substantially
reformed the law in holding that “mandatory life-without-parole
sentences for juveniles are cruel and unusual violations of the
40
Eighth Amendment.” Just because an inmate’s JMLWOP sentence
was rendered before Miller does not mean that the JMLWOP
sentence was any less unconstitutional. Imposing life-withoutparole sentences on juveniles “cannot be justified by the goal of
41
because inmates serving life-without-parole
rehabilitation”
sentences “are often denied access to vocational training and other
42
rehabilitative services that are available to others.” In denying
juveniles basic rehabilitative services and a chance to reenter the
community as a rehabilitated citizen, states make “irrevocable
43
judgment[s] about that person’s value and place in society.”
Applying Miller’s holding retroactively will help provide convicted
juveniles an opportunity for rehabilitation and assimilation back
into society.
Furthermore, judges who imposed JMLWOP sentences before
38. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460 (holding that JMLWOP sentences are
unconstitutional.).
39. Id. at 2469.
40. Id. at 2464.
41. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029–30.
42. Id. at 2030.
43. Id.
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Miller were unable to consider the soundness of such sentences.
Rather, these judges were forced to abide by statutorily prescribed
rules. Applying Miller retroactively, will provide judges with the
opportunity to reassess the sentences of those 2,500 individuals
serving JMLWOPs. This is a relatively manageable number that will
never increase now that Miller applies to all future cases. Thus,
judges will not be overly burdened by only having to reevaluate
prior JMLWOP sentences. Regardless, these sentences should be
reconsidered because many juveniles are serving what is now
deemed an unconstitutional sentence. Since it would now be
unconstitutional for these individuals to receive JMLWOP
sentences, it is unlikely that their convictions before Miller are
accurate. Furthermore, because Miller created a watershed rule of
criminal procedure, Teague requires that states apply Miller
retroactively.
Conclusion
One of the core functions of departments of corrections is to
maintain “programs to enhance the success of offenders’ reentry
44
Regardless of these programs’ efficacy to
into society.”
rehabilitate convicted individuals, the purpose of rehabilitation
programs will not be fulfilled for individuals given JMLWOP
sentences. For example, a now fifty-year-old individual who
committed a crime at age fourteen and has since matured into a
completely different person through the department of
corrections’ rehabilitative programs will have no opportunity to
reenter and contribute to society in a State that declines to apply
Miller retroactively. Accordingly, it is difficult to understand what
incentive these juveniles would have to rehabilitate when they
know that there is zero possibility they will get to leave prison and
reenter society because of a sentence they received as an
undeveloped juvenile. Therefore, when Miller is given a retroactive
effect, the purpose of rehabilitation is entirely unfulfilled.
The 2,500 inmates in the U.S. currently serving JMLWOP were
automatically sentenced upon a finding of guilt, regardless of their
age.
If Miller only applies to future offenses, those 2,500
individuals will never have a chance to reduce their sentence,
irrespective of their good behavior in prison. By requiring
44. Agency
Overview,
ILL.
DEP’T
OF
CORR.
(Sept.
http://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/aboutus/Pages/IDOCOverview.aspx.

8,

2013),
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consideration of a juvenile’s age and the hallmark features of that
age, applying Miller retroactively would grant those 2,500
individuals a chance to have now unconstitutional statutorilyimposed sentences reexamined. Moreover, states should apply
Miller retroactively to incentivize inmates to rehabilitate themselves
with the hope that they may receive a chance to reenter society.

